Choosing Agents: Members of the European Parliament and their Political Organizations Seen through Report Allocation
AbstractThis dissertation treats with partisan organization in the European Parliament (EP) and its impact on members’ (MEPs) career opportunities. National parties organize elections. Parliamentary work is organized around transnational political groups. They do not share any overarching organizational structure. My contributions pertain to the interconnected choices made by MEPs and their two party organizations. Parliamentary groups face a trade-off between the need for expertise and the risk of agency drift. Groups allocate reports to maximize the value added by the rapporteur while limiting the drift. They prefer policy experts to generalists and – up to a point – experienced MEPs to newcomers. Groups also balance individual demands with the collective need. National parties do not have institutionalized presence in the EP. They enter into an outcome-based contract similar to voters. MEPs are either rewarded by reselection or kicked out of office. Report allocations dissipate uncertainty about MEPs’ ability. They thus improve MEPs’ career prospects to the extent that parties need new information about agent quality, and to the extent that parliamentary groups can provide it.
List of papers
|Chapter 2: (Self-)selection and Expertise among Decision Makers. Published as: (Self-)selection and expertise among decision makers in the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies 2018, vol 24(1), pp 148-172. DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631. The article is included in the thesis. Also available at https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631|
|Chapter 3: Delegation in Committees. coauthored with Fang-Yi Chiou and Bjørn Hyland. Published as: Chiou, F.-Y., Hermansen, S. S., & Høyland, B. (2020). Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament. European Union Politics, 21(2), 233–254. DOI: 10.1177/1465116519894059. The article is included in the thesis. Also available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116519894059|
|Chapter 4: Striving for Influence: The Effect of Performance. Published as: Striving for influence. The effect of performance on candidate selection. Party Politics 2018, vol 24(4), pp 382-396. DOI: 10.1177/1354068816663036. The article is included in the thesis. Also available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816663036|
|Chapter 5: How Legislated Gender Quotas Impact Representation. Manuscript. Included in the thesis.|