EU Conditionality and Anti-Corruption: The case of Bulgaria and its incentive game

Abstract

This master s thesis analyzes the role of EU conditionality and the fight against corruption in Bulgaria. The thesis aims at explaining why anti-corruption measures in Bulgaria have failed. By looking at external factors and the role of EU conditionality, as well as domestic factors in Bulgaria, the thesis provides conditionality-studies with an original in-depth investigation of the topic. The EU has for the last two decades acted as a democratic and judicial advisor for its candidate- and member states. Conditionality is the EU s instrument to direct policies in these states, mainly prior to a state s accession. Bulgaria is a special case due to the fact that EU decided to extend its conditionality to the country once it became an EU member in 2007. High levels of corruption and organized crime were one of the main reasons for this act. Curbing corruption in the country therefore became a priority for the EU and Bulgaria, yet corruption is still a widespread issue here. The thesis applies elements from conditionality theory and legal transfer theory. This allows for a thorough investigation of potential factors that may prevent anti-corruption measures from taking hold in Bulgarian society. Invaluable empirical data are collected through in- depth interviews in order to shed light on the research questions. The main findings of the thesis suggest that EU conditionality has not been strong enough as to influence Bulgaria in its fight against corruption. The findings more importantly indicate that domestic factors play a crucial part for the lack of implementation of and commitment to establish anti-corruption measures in the Bulgarian society.