The subject-matter of this thesis is business ethics. The purpose of this thesis is an attempted revival of the stockholder theory, to show that it is a viable position, but in need of augmentation. The thesis defends the stockholder theory as envisioned by Milton Friedman, that the only social responsibility of corporations is to increase its profits, while staying within "the rules of the game" which are a set of side-constraints on profit-maximization. Friedman offers two broad set of arguments in favor of his position. The first is a set of deontological arguments in favor of fiduciary duties and against Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The second line of argumentation is a utilitarian or broadly consequentialist argument against corporations taking on CSR. Using a framework from Nicholas Capaldi of rival business ethical paradigms, I argue that the opponents who attack the stockholder position do so from a set of radically different assumptions and that their arguments do not dislodge the internal consistency of the stockholder theory, nor do they effectively challenge its ethical base. Further, I show what would be required for an argument to be successful against the deontological argument for fiduciary duties and illustrate that the most common arguments for corporations to take on a wider set of social responsibilities and obligations than the stockholder theory allows for fail in their present form. The arguments for the dismissal of the fiduciary duties rest on assumptions that are counter-intuitive and are not properly grounded. This makes the arguments too weak to oust the stockholder theory. The stockholder theory does have a number of serious weaknesses that need to be remedied if the position is to function as a viable and fully functioning normative business ethics. The stockholder theory provides the goal of business as profit-maximization, but provides little in regards to the specifics of how executives are to maintain the interests of the stockholders. A further, weakness is the side-constraints that are ambiguous and that could dilute and undermine the stockholder position. It also makes it susceptible to cultural and ethical relativism. I argue that the side-constraints need to be replaced. I then proceed to briefly indicate a possible neo-Aristotelian solution that would augment the stockholder theory.