The aim of this master thesis is to make a convincing argument that scientific progress can be spoken of in objective terms. In order to make this argument I will propose a philosophical theory of scientific progress. Two concepts will be constructed with this aim in mind, both which are types of strength measures on scientific theories. The first concept, that of logical strength, pertains to the way a theory may exclude, or permit less, model classes compared to another theory. The second concept, that of empirical strength, pertains to an objective measure of the informational content of data models, defined in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. This latter idea stems from communication and computational theory. Scientific progress is then defined as the interaction, or the stepwise increases, of these two strength measures. Central for the conception of a scientific theory is the philosophical framework known as The Semantic View of Scientific Theories. This view can briefly be characterized as an empirical extension of Tarskian model-theory. Another central notion for this theory of scientific progress is the philosophical or metaphysical thesis called structural realism. Both will accordingly be explained and argued for. Finally, as a test on this proposed theory of scientific progress, it will be applied to two examples of theory transition from the history of physical theory. I conclude that the proposed theory handles these two cases well.