This thesis examines Western involvement in the Libyan crisis in 2011, more specifically why the Western threat of force proved to be ineffective as it failed to compel Gaddafi to comply with the requirements of Resolution 1973. In order to answer this question, I model the strategic interaction between the West and Gaddafi and develop two game theoretic models. The models are developed on the basis of Hovi’s theory of effective threats (1998:13-16). The first model, developed under the assumption of complete information, shows that it was significant for the outcome whether or not Gaddafi perceived the Western threat as being sufficiently severe and credible. The model demonstrates that the threat of force was ineffective because the requirement of the threat being sufficiently severe was not met. The second model, developed under the assumption of incomplete information, demonstrates that for Gaddafi to yield to the threat of military force, he had to be sufficiently convinced of Western intentions. More specifically, Gaddafi had to be sufficiently convinced that the West was not seeking regime change in Libya. The wider implications of the results are that demands and actions that have a bearing on the vital interests of a target should be taken into consideration for the use of force at the threat level to succeed.