Abstract
Oppgaven diskuterer kroppens moralske status i forhold til Kant, MacIntyre og Care Ethics.
Utdrag fra innledningen:
Arguments concerning organ donors and other so called ‘bio-ethical’ questions have been numerous both in the popular press and in more specialized publications during the last couple of years. Questions regarding selection of and research on fertilized human eggs, abortion, organ donation and euthanasia have been aggressively debated both by the general public and by professional philosophers, and in all likelihood these arguments will continue and grow in the foreseeable future as we see the possibilities of intervention and ‘improvement’ increasing through medical research. However, several of these arguments arise from positions that appear to take certain ideas about both moral philosophy and the human body for granted. Usually these ideas point to a certain ‘location’ within our lives or our bodies as the starting point or foundation of our moral worth or lack thereof; and many of the disputes and the participants in these subsequently disagree more about where exactly this marker is to be found in a ‘technical’ sense than anything else. The general and questionable understanding within these ‘bio-ethical’ arguments seems to be that if this point could be sufficiently delineated and agreed upon, these disputes would be much fewer in number and easier to resolve.