• English
    • Norsk
  • English 
    • English
    • Norsk
  • Administration
View Item 
  •   Home
  • Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet
  • Økonomisk institutt
  • Økonomisk institutt
  • View Item
  •   Home
  • Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet
  • Økonomisk institutt
  • Økonomisk institutt
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership

Vislie, Jon
Working paper
View/Open
4867.pdf (154.8Kb)
Year
2001
Permanent link
http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-3132

Is part of
Memorandum fra Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
Metadata
Show metadata
Appears in the following Collection
  • Økonomisk institutt [1515]
Abstract
Regulating an export firm (or a homogeneous industry) with private information about emission technology is analysed, when the firm, owned partly by foreigners, has an option to bypass domestic regulation through costly relocation. If the firm chooses to relocate, it will set up a new plant in a region practicing environmental dumping, at a cost that is correlated with emission efficiency, so as to make the firm’s reservation utility type-dependent. We characterise the set of optimal contracts offered by the uninformed, domestic government under different ownership structures, when domestic taxation is distortive, and when welfare is the sum of consumers’ surplus and the share of the firm’s rent accruing to domestic residents. With complete information, ownership has no real effects. When information is incomplete, ownership matters, due to rent extraction, being of greater significance when ownership rights are shifted towards foreigners. Rent extraction is accomplished by offering contracts with lower output and higher net emissions to a subset of the most efficient types (being induced to stay), whereas a subset of the least efficient types should be induced to relocate. A demand for environmental dumping is being induced by the domestic government’s concern for national interests. When barriers towards foreign ownership are lowered, and then shifting the distribution of ownership rights in the favour of foreigners, more pollution will be generated for types of the firm that do not exit, whereas a larger fraction of the firm types should be induced to relocate.
 
Responsible for this website 
University of Oslo Library


Contact Us 
duo-hjelp@ub.uio.no


Privacy policy
 

 

For students / employeesSubmit master thesisAccess to restricted material

Browse

All of DUOCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitles

For library staff

Login
RSS Feeds
 
Responsible for this website 
University of Oslo Library


Contact Us 
duo-hjelp@ub.uio.no


Privacy policy