The German Europapolitik: centralised or decentralised? : an analysis of the coordination of the German Europapolitik

Abstract

This paper is about the coordination of Germany s Europapolitik. More specifically it is about the preparation of political positions in relation to European Union decision making processes in Berlin. It is often claimed by scholars on decision making in Berlin that German representatives are uncoordinated in Brussels, meaning that the German actors are unable to agree on common positions in Berlin before negotiations take place in Brussels. I have chosen to take a closer look at this statement by defining different types of coordination and then studied which type of coordination best describes the German Europapolitik. This study has been conducted using a rational choice-institutional perspective, by focusing on important actors, veto points and institutional factors, channelling and constraining actor behaviour. Furthermore, the study is principally qualitative in nature, but I have included a few examples and two case studies. The result is a more nuanced picture including the description of the importance of institutional factors and actors in the coordination of the Europapolitik.