Abstract
In Russia, the political system is usually described as a power vertical with President Vladimir Putin on top. Below, smaller networks are situated around distinct political actors. This thesis explores to what extent such networks are able to influence Russian politics by the provision of particular services to the regime. The thesis analyses the emergence of the networks, the services they deliver, and their widespread connections. Combining Henry E. Hale’s model on Patronal Politics (2015) and Marlene Laruelle’s concept of entrepreneurs of influence (2021), the thesis discusses the networks, and finds that the relationship between the apex of the Putin-regime and the various networks is crucial for regime stability, but it also involves a risk. The networks of Evgeniy Prigozhin and Konstantin Malofeev are studied as cases through a content analysis of 285 Russian language media articles. Social network analysis is used to visualise these networks. This thesis takes the wide range of services they deliver and their networks position into consideration and explores to what extent these patriotic entrepreneurs affect the distribution of power within the political system itself. Their service rendering might also be a double-edged sword – by offering services within ideology (conservatism) and public deniability (military services), they place themselves in mainstream Russian politics, but the wider consequences of these services at the meso-level of analysis have not been studied thoroughly. The theories used are placed in the broader landscape of hybrid regime theories and governance theories. The thesis concludes that networks of patriotic entrepreneurs are able to influence the Russian political sphere through services delivered to the regime by evaluating what the Kremlin needs based on current situations within Russia and abroad. The networks then provide services according to this, and thus receive rewards, be it in terms of influence, profit, or position within the political system in Russia.