In today's modern society, the increasing demands for connectivity andaccessibility place computers in ever larger internetworks. As moreand more computers become globally accessible, the number of threatsfrom random and targeted attacks rise rapidly. To counter known andunknown threats, various technologies and concepts are employed asdefensive measures. One concept that is in rising popularity iscomputer deception, the subject of this thesis.
The field of computer deception is characterized by fragmentation andis lacking unified definitions and methods. This thesis has reviewedfive deception paradigms, in order to build a descriptive theory thatis used for understanding the concept of computer deception. Theborder between human deception and computer deception is investigated.
The thesis concludes that computer deception for defense rarely can beseen as a field unrelated to human deception. When attacker tools aretargeted for deception, they are only intermediary steps on the way toa human attacker. This makes the core issues of computer deception amatter of psychology, not technology. Computer specialists withoutknowledge of psychology do not have the expertise necessary forestimating the consequences of deceptions on human attackers.