Do renewable terms compromise judicial independence? Scholars of various courts have demonstrated relationships between judges' voting patterns and the interests of actors responsible for their (re)appointment. However, it is typically unclear if such relationships are (at least partially) explained by judges acting strategically to achieve reappointment or if they are (fully) attributable to selection effects. I exploit a 2010 reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to estimate the casual effect of removing reappointment opportunities on judges' independence. The ECtHR bench consists of one judge from each member state and judges sit ex officio on cases involving their nominating state. Prior to 2010, terms were renewable. Judges seeking reappointment were therefore incentivized to favor their nominating states. In 2010, the terms were made nonrenewable with immediate effect for judges on the Court. I show that removing reappointment opportunities signifficantly reduced judges' tendency to favor their nominating states.