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dc.date.accessioned2021-04-09T20:25:01Z
dc.date.available2021-04-09T20:25:01Z
dc.date.created2020-11-06T09:06:28Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationBruusgaard, Kristin Ven . Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2020
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/85144
dc.description.abstractContemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia’s nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalating to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.
dc.languageEN
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleRussian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority
dc.typeJournal article
dc.creator.authorBruusgaard, Kristin Ven
cristin.unitcode185,17,8,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for statsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1
dc.identifier.cristin1845488
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Journal of Strategic Studies&rft.volume=&rft.spage=&rft.date=2020
dc.identifier.jtitleJournal of Strategic Studies
dc.identifier.volume44
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.startpage3
dc.identifier.endpage35
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-87995
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn0140-2390
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/85144/1/Russian%2BNuclear%2BStrategy%2Band%2Bconventional%2Binferiority.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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