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dc.contributor.authorWeston, Hedda
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-20T23:04:46Z
dc.date.available2021-03-20T23:04:46Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationWeston, Hedda. Humanising Hell - A normative look at the state’s permissibility of placing its soldiers in harm’s way. Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2020
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/84374
dc.description.abstractBeing a soldier entails the fact that you may be placed in harm’s way, for the benefit of your state and fellow citizens. As a soldier, you are at the same time the human instrument of war, as well as the legitimate human targets. I find this a fascinating juxtaposition. Because of this, I wanted to explore the state’s permissibility of placing soldiers in harm’s way, by way of asking “What demands can the state morally place on their soldiers, in terms of risking their soldiers’ lives”. This thesis is a normative look at what demands the state morally can place on their soldiers when these demands conflict or infringe upon the soldiers’ right to life. To explore the research question, I have dedicated chapters which each grapple with a possible solution to the answer. The analysis of the thesis, therefore consists of three chapters in total. In the first chapter, I seek to say something about whether placing soldiers in harm’s way is permissible because of the good it produces. This relates to the utilitarian concept of aggregation. I approach this chapter both through an intuitionistic methodology, as well as a theoretical one, with contractualism as my method of choice. I refute aggregation, because of its horrid implications for the individual. Additionally, allowing for aggregation does not sufficiently account for the individual value of all people within the groups. However, this chapter rested on the assumption that soldiers and civilians were morally equal. Chapter two explores why this may not be the case. In chapter two, I explore whether there are any compelling reasons to treat soldiers morally unequal to civilians, given what their role entails. I do this by exploring the implications of the arguments of two esteemed just war theorist, and how they relate to the soldiers right to self-defence and self-preservation. I find that both the theorists accept that soldiers have a weaker right to life, because of their role. However, I argue that the reasoning only holds to account for why soldiers can be killed in war and not what made them liable to be placed in a position which infringed on their rights, in the first place. This is to say that it may be reasonable to argue that the soldiers lost their right to life because of their role and the fact that their role entails the right and duty to kill. However, arguing that the implications of a role are reason enough to place people within this role is a tautological fallacy. The third chapter seeks to answer whether it is ever permissible to place soldiers in harm’s way. I argue that it is, but simply relying on a democratic decision is not sufficient. I sketch out certain conditions, which I argue for why they should be present in a moral treatment of a soldier. Without these conditions, I argue that the state has treated the soldier as if her life is not considered valuable. I base this conclusion on a general intuition, I have about sacrificing your life, and by exploring its implications, both in a general sense and within the context of war. The aim of answering such a research question is not first and foremost to say something prescriptive about how states should act, but rather what would be a moral treatment of soldiers, by the state. That being said, considering the fact that people lay their lives on the line for the state, states do owe these soldiers to value their lives to the best of their abilities.nob
dc.description.abstractBeing a soldier entails the fact that you may be placed in harm’s way, for the benefit of your state and fellow citizens. As a soldier, you are at the same time the human instrument of war, as well as the legitimate human targets. I find this a fascinating juxtaposition. Because of this, I wanted to explore the state’s permissibility of placing soldiers in harm’s way, by way of asking “What demands can the state morally place on their soldiers, in terms of risking their soldiers’ lives”. This thesis is a normative look at what demands the state morally can place on their soldiers when these demands conflict or infringe upon the soldiers’ right to life. To explore the research question, I have dedicated chapters which each grapple with a possible solution to the answer. The analysis of the thesis, therefore consists of three chapters in total. In the first chapter, I seek to say something about whether placing soldiers in harm’s way is permissible because of the good it produces. This relates to the utilitarian concept of aggregation. I approach this chapter both through an intuitionistic methodology, as well as a theoretical one, with contractualism as my method of choice. I refute aggregation, because of its horrid implications for the individual. Additionally, allowing for aggregation does not sufficiently account for the individual value of all people within the groups. However, this chapter rested on the assumption that soldiers and civilians were morally equal. Chapter two explores why this may not be the case. In chapter two, I explore whether there are any compelling reasons to treat soldiers morally unequal to civilians, given what their role entails. I do this by exploring the implications of the arguments of two esteemed just war theorist, and how they relate to the soldiers right to self-defence and self-preservation. I find that both the theorists accept that soldiers have a weaker right to life, because of their role. However, I argue that the reasoning only holds to account for why soldiers can be killed in war and not what made them liable to be placed in a position which infringed on their rights, in the first place. This is to say that it may be reasonable to argue that the soldiers lost their right to life because of their role and the fact that their role entails the right and duty to kill. However, arguing that the implications of a role are reason enough to place people within this role is a tautological fallacy. The third chapter seeks to answer whether it is ever permissible to place soldiers in harm’s way. I argue that it is, but simply relying on a democratic decision is not sufficient. I sketch out certain conditions, which I argue for why they should be present in a moral treatment of a soldier. Without these conditions, I argue that the state has treated the soldier as if her life is not considered valuable. I base this conclusion on a general intuition, I have about sacrificing your life, and by exploring its implications, both in a general sense and within the context of war. The aim of answering such a research question is not first and foremost to say something prescriptive about how states should act, but rather what would be a moral treatment of soldiers, by the state. That being said, considering the fact that people lay their lives on the line for the state, states do owe these soldiers to value their lives to the best of their abilities.eng
dc.language.isonob
dc.subjectjus in bello
dc.subjectMcMahan
dc.subjectjust war theory
dc.subjectjus ad bellum
dc.subjectright to life
dc.subjectsoldier
dc.subjectKamm
dc.subjectnormative politics
dc.subjectpolitical philosophy
dc.subjectWalzer
dc.subjectRawls
dc.titleHumanising Hell - A normative look at the state’s permissibility of placing its soldiers in harm’s waynob
dc.title.alternativeHumanising Hell - A normative look at the state’s permissibility of placing its soldiers in harm’s wayeng
dc.typeMaster thesis
dc.date.updated2021-03-21T23:01:31Z
dc.creator.authorWeston, Hedda
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-87035
dc.type.documentMasteroppgave
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/84374/1/Masteroppgaven-h-sten-2020.pdf


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