The European Union made a deal with Turkey in March 2016 in an attempt to lower the number of refugees coming to Europe. In return the EU would give financial aid to refugees staying in Turkey. This is known as the EU-Turkey deal. The European Parliament shall consent to agreements with countries outside of the EU, but the EU-Turkey deal was never passed by this institution. The European Parliament is still expected to participate in the implementation of the deal, most prominently, by approving funding to Turkey over the EU budget. The way the funding process is set up further limits the European Parliament’s influence over the EU-Turkey deal. In this qualitative case study, I explore what can explain the limited impact of the European Parliament on the EU-Turkey deal. I find that the Parliament was in fact pushed out of the creation of the deal. This may show that the EU in this case is moving in a more intergovernmental direction, despite its supranational development in the past decades. Additionally, the European Parliament has scarcely been able to use its formal powers in the implementation process. However, the Parliament has managed to get access to information about use of European tax payers’ money through its budgetary power, and through the more informal method of parliamentary diplomacy. Theory on foreign policy suggests that the European Parliament can use informal power to influence and get access to information about decisions. However, my findings suggest that the Parliament has been more concerned with keeping communication with the other EU institutions transparent and open since the creation of the EU-Turkey deal in 2016. This is in stark contrast to the closed-door meetings that led to the creation of the EU-Turkey deal, and shows that the European Parliament is working to uphold its democratic mandate – despite the lack of democratic processes in the creation of the deal.