Abstract When Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office in January 1981, the United States’ position in the Middle East had been on quite the rollercoaster. In just a few years, the U.S. had lost its ally in Iran, the Shah, and the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. In addition, Iran and Iraq were at war, and tensions were building in Lebanon. Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had been a central architect of the Camp David Accords. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed in March 1979 and marked a new phase in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the Cold War became a race for allies in the Middle East, Egypt’s turn from East to West, and the peace treaty with Israel, solidified the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. Egypt had become a strategic fixture in U.S. foreign policy. This thesis depicts the U.S.-Egyptian relationship during the first three years of Ronald Reagan’s first presidential term. The primary task of this thesis has been to study how the relationship evolved and what influenced the Reagan administration’s policies towards Egypt. The two new partners had enjoyed a honeymoon phase between 1974-1979. What informed the new post-Camp David chapter between the two countries that would allow the relationship to endure to this day.