• English
    • Norsk
  • English 
    • English
    • Norsk
  • Administration
View Item 
  •   Home
  • Øvrige samlinger
  • Høstingsarkiver
  • CRIStin høstingsarkiv
  • View Item
  •   Home
  • Øvrige samlinger
  • Høstingsarkiver
  • CRIStin høstingsarkiv
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?

Mørch, Hedda Hassel
Journal article; SubmittedVersion
View/Open
HHM+Does+dispositionalism+entail+panpsychism.pdf (440.1Kb)
Year
2018
Permanent link
http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-74825

CRIStin
1623936

Metadata
Show metadata
Appears in the following Collection
  • Institutt for filosofi, ide- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk [301]
  • CRIStin høstingsarkiv [14986]
Original version
Topoi. 2018, 1-16, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
Abstract
According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
 
Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?
 
Responsible for this website 
University of Oslo Library


Contact Us 
duo-hjelp@ub.uio.no


Privacy policy
 

 

For students / employeesSubmit master thesisAccess to restricted material

Browse

All of DUOCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitles

For library staff

Login
RSS Feeds
 
Responsible for this website 
University of Oslo Library


Contact Us 
duo-hjelp@ub.uio.no


Privacy policy