Abstract
What does it mean to be a good person? According to virtue ethics, being a good person is to possess the moral character traits we call virtues, such as justice, honesty and generosity. These character traits are often compared to practical skills, in the sense that they are acquired competencies that require training and result in an ability to make good judgments. This thesis explores the relationship between virtuous dispositions and practical skills in the works of Aristotle, Annas and Stichter. The first three chapters present how each philosopher conceives of this relationship. In the first chapter, I will explore Aristotle’s notion of virtue and skill. We will see that while they share some features, they are treated as two different kinds of dispositions. I identify six arguments against virtue being a skill and argue that any contemporary philosopher attempting to model virtue on skill today should pay attention to these arguments. I move on to present how Annas and Stichter conceive of the relationship between virtue and skill, and consider how they respond to the Aristotelian arguments presented in the first chapter. We will see that Annas views the relationship between virtue and skill as analogical, claiming that certain aspects of skill can illuminate certain aspects of virtue. I call this the ‘illumination-thesis’. Stichter, on the other hand, argues that virtues are skills. I call this the ‘identification-thesis’. Analyzing Annas and Stichter in light of Aristotle allows us to identify the analogous and disanalogous features of virtue and skill in each philosopher. In the fourth and final chapter, I identify three major disagreements between Annas and Stichter and consider which theory we should prefer concerning each disagreement. This leads me to defend the following three claims. I argue that we have good empirical reasons to doubt the articulacy requirement for skill in general, but that at the same time we have good philosophical reasons to require at least some degree of articulacy in virtue. I move on to argue that the relationship between virtues and skills should be conceived as analogical, due to the number of issues I identify with the identification-thesis. And finally, I argue that self-control should not be conceived as a virtue, as Stichter’s view entails, since the need to exercise self-control reflects a conflict of desire and reason.