This paper seeks to account for the wickedness of the non-identity problem – or lack thereof. Within the field of bioethics, the non-identity problem is particularly relevant due to progress within assisted reproductive technology which allows potential parents or single reproducers to select for wanted or against unwanted traits. By analyzing a disagreement concerning whether parents should be allowed to select for disability or other conditions which are detrimental to the wellbeing of an individual, this paper attempts to account for any potential wickedness represented by the non-identity problem in practice. This paper concludes that the non-identity problem might be an instance of what Sidgwick called the profoundest problem in practical ethics. As a result, solving the non-identity problem might require solving one of the most wicked problems in practical ethics. This could be a welcome conclusion for those who wish to reject that there is a moral obligation to select against disability. On the other hand, there might be cases where we must collectively agree on how to deal with the non-identity problem. This might give rise to some concern about the limits of practical ethics.