According to alethic primitivism, the concept of truth cannot be explicated by other concepts that are more fundamental. Alethic primitivism consists of a set of positive and negative claims. The positive claims are that the concept of truth is fundamental, explanatorily potent, central, and important. The negative claims are that the concept of truth is unanalysable, indefinable, and irreducible. In this thesis, I consider whether a compelling case can be made for this theory. To that end, I discuss three of the strongest arguments in favour of it: Asay’s omnipresence argument, the argument from conceptual fundamentality, and an abductive argument for alethic primitivism. The omnipresence argument purports to show that truth is part of each and every proposition, and hence that no non-circular analysis of it is possible. The argument from conceptual fundamentality purports to show, first, that some concepts are fundamental and, second, that truth is one of these concepts. The last argument, if sound, shows through abduction – that is, inference to the best explanation – that primitivism is the best theory of truth on offer and so the one we should accept. Although I reject the first argument and show that more work needs to be done in order to establish primitivism based on the others, what emerges from the discussion is that primitivism is an interesting, plausible, and defensible theory of truth. The conclusion I reach is accordingly modest: alethic primitivism is an interesting theory of truth worthy of serious consideration and a place among the major theories of truth.