This thesis deals with the topic of contingency in metaethical constructivism. Metaethical constructivism claims that our reasons are necessarily connected to the particular values of agents. Holding such an attitude-dependent view seemingly leads to problematic conclusions concerning moral reasons. It is my aim to investigate how deep these problems run. To introduce the problem of contingency I start by giving an overview of the metaethical landscape which constructivism is positioned into. In the following chapter, I present a leading example of Kantian constructivism formulated by Christine Korsgaard. Her account serves as a foundation for all constructivist theories presented in this thesis. In chapter three, I present an objection to Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism formulated by Sharon Street. Street claims that Korsgaard fails to maintain the contingency principle constitutive of all constructivist theories and presents a Humean alternative to the Kantian view. In the fourth chapter, I investigate attempts at consoling Humean theories from issues concerning contingency and moral reasons, ultimately arguing that contingency worries are not as damaging for Humean theories as initially thought. The fifth chapter concludes.