According to Miranda Fricker, hermeneutical injustices are instances of conceptual absences where these absences create a significant difficulty for a knower in making herself intelligible either to herself or to another. These absences are the product of structural inequalities in our society, which shape what epistemic resources we have available to us. This in turn shapes who we are and what the world is like. The story of hermeneutical injustices is a story of conceptual change, yet Fricker’s commitments about conceptual change are often implicit and occasionally incompatible with her claims about hermeneutical injustice. This thesis aims to make Fricker’s commitments explicit in conceptual engineering terms, in order to evaluate her account, the criticisms it has drawn and the approaches to hermeneutical justice it has inspired. Fricker is committed to specific accounts of conceptual change on four different fronts: conceptual control; ignorance; conceptual absences and conceptual virtue. After making her commitments explicit, I evaluate their implications for the criticism against Fricker’s account. These are divided into three clusters: criticism regarding the scope of her definition, those that question the mechanisms that produce hermeneutical injustice, and those that reject it as not properly epistemic. Finally, I discuss three suggested approaches to hermeneutical injustice: one virtue-based, one based on structural change and one attitude-based approach. Based on the evaluation of Fricker’s commitments and the criticisms just outlined, I argue that Fricker’s approach to conceptual engineering is best read as externalist and function-oriented. Moreover, I argue that Fricker is a social constructivist about concepts. Applying this modified version of Fricker to the criticisms highlights an explanatory gap. I suggest two ways that an explanation using function-oriented conceptual engineering could begin to fill in this gap. After surveying three approaches to hermeneutical justice, I conclude that the externalist function-oriented social constructivist version of Fricker suggests a better way to conceptually engineer hermeneutical justice than the approaches available in the literature so far.