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dc.date.accessioned2018-11-13T12:09:21Z
dc.date.available2019-07-29T22:47:25Z
dc.date.created2018-08-23T21:02:40Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationStrandberg, Caj . Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons. Dialectica. 2018, 72(1), 69-100
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/65482
dc.description.abstractA theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.en_US
dc.languageEN
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing
dc.titleTowards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasonsen_US
dc.title.alternativeENEngelskEnglishTowards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.creator.authorStrandberg, Caj
cristin.unitcode185,14,33,20
cristin.unitnameFilosofi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.cristin1604161
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.jtitle=Dialectica&rft.volume=72&rft.spage=69&rft.date=2018
dc.identifier.jtitleDialectica
dc.identifier.volume72
dc.identifier.issue1
dc.identifier.startpage69
dc.identifier.endpage100
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1746-8361.12216
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-68253
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkelen_US
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.source.issn0012-2017
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/65482/2/Towards_an_Ecumenical_Theory_of_Normativ.pdf
dc.type.versionAcceptedVersion


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