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dc.contributor.authorMyskja, Bjørn K
dc.contributor.authorMagelssen, Morten
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-23T05:02:20Z
dc.date.available2018-10-23T05:02:20Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationBMC Medical Ethics. 2018 Oct 19;19(1):82
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/65224
dc.description.abstractBackground In the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare, proponents of conscience rights often point to the imperative to protect the health professional’s moral integrity. Their opponents hold that the moral integrity argument alone can at most justify accommodation of conscientious objectors as a “moral courtesy”, as the argument is insufficient to establish a general moral right to accommodation, let alone a legal right. Main text This text draws on political philosophy in order to argue for a legal right to accommodation. The moral integrity arguments should be supplemented by the requirement to protect minority rights in liberal democracies. Citizens have a right to live in accordance with their fundamental moral convictions, and a right to equal access to employment. However, this right should not be unconditional, as that would unduly infringe on the rights of other citizens. The right must be limited to cases where the moral basis is more fundamental in a sense that all reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should accept, such as the constitutive role of the inviolability of human life in liberal democracies. Conclusion There should be a legal, yet circumscribed, right to accommodation for conscientious objectors refusing to provide healthcare services that they reasonably consider to involve the intentional killing of a human being.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThe Author(s).
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleConscientious objection to intentional killing: an argument for toleration
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2018-10-23T05:02:20Z
dc.creator.authorMyskja, Bjørn K
dc.creator.authorMagelssen, Morten
dc.identifier.cristin1621757
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-018-0323-0
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-67752
dc.type.documentTidsskriftartikkel
dc.type.peerreviewedPeer reviewed
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/65224/1/12910_2018_Article_323.pdf
dc.type.versionPublishedVersion
cristin.articleid82


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