This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are “strong” and districts are in charge of extracting their own ...

Securing open access to research will not remove the fundamental problem that commercial publishers have substantial market power. Thus, even if Plan S is successful, large commercial publishers are likely to put financial ...

A growing body of evidence suggests that individuals have time-inconsistent pref-erences. Even when they do not, policy makers who fear to loose elections willapply discount rates that decrease in relative time when they ...

A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller prefers to conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but ...

This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are ...

Public regulation is increasingly facing competition from “private politics” in the form of activism and corporate self-regulation. However, its effectiveness, welfare consequences, and interaction with public regulation ...

Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost‐effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed ...

In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We ...