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Counting Incompossibles

Fritz, Peter; Goodman, Jeremy
Journal article; AcceptedVersion; Peer reviewed
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final+draft27864.pdf (756.7Kb)
Year
2017
Permanent link
http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-62515

CRIStin
1458618

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Appears in the following Collection
  • Institutt for filosofi, ide- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk [329]
  • CRIStin høstingsarkiv [16955]
Original version
Mind (Print). 2017, 126 (504), 1063-1108, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw026
Abstract
We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all.

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record is available online at:chttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw026
 
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