This thesis explores the structural and cultural features of the Darknet market AlphaBay. The main focus is on the cybercrime sections of the market, specifically those dealing in cybercrime tools and services. The Internet, and particularly the Darknet, provides its users with anonymity and therefore has become a new arena for criminal and deviant behaviour. Several studies have been conducted on the online trade of drugs, sexually explicit materials, and other illicit materials and goods, but few have been dedicated to the distribution of cybercrime tools and services. The objectives of this thesis are therefore: to investigate the formal and informal mechanisms that are implemented to regulate the marketplace; to evaluate the possible influence of hacker culture on the market culture of cybercrime markets; and to examine how general market culture is displayed on the marketplace and identify a specific market culture for cybercrime markets. To answer these objectives a qualitative approach was deemed best, and subsequently a combination of netnography and grounded theory was applied in order to ensure due diligence. The data collected consists of 1175 screenshots taken from both the marketplace and the connected forum. In addition, a research journal was also kept to complement the screenshots collected. It functioned as a means for the researcher to remember the processes such as becoming a member, as well as a way of writing down thoughts and impressions that emerged throughout the fieldwork; much like fieldnotes in traditional ethnography. The data was analysed within a framework made out of economic sociological contributions, as well as criminological and sociological literature on hacker culture. The backbone of the thesis is largely Aspers’ (2011) distinction between general market culture and specific market culture, which is present in both analysis chapters and further deliberated in the final chapter. In addition, previous criminological, sociological and economic research on online illegal markets form a foundation for comparison, and are discussed throughout the thesis. The structural features of AlphaBay and the formal and informal mechanisms of regulation are the subject of analysis in chapter five. Here, the coordination problems of illegal markets identified by Beckert and Wehinger (2012) are used as an analytical tool in order to understand how the structural features are designed to tackle these problems of coordination, and to investigate the formal and informal mechanisms implemented. AlphaBay, like many other online legal and illegal markets, had formal mechanisms such as market rules, payment method, staff, trust levels, and a feedback system. These mechanisms, combined with the mechanism of punishment for transgression, are implemented by the administration as a way of regulating the market by ensuring order, trust, efficiency, and transparency. These elements are imitations of legal markets, where the state is the regulating force, legislative measures are implemented to regulate the market actors, and legal recourse is available if someone should be cheated. According to Beckert and Wehinger, illegal markets are structurally inefficient because of their intransparency, but this thesis argues that online illegal markets are more transparent than their physical equivalents, and therefore structurally efficient. In addition, issues of trust are central in illegal online markets, because of their anonymous and secretive nature. These formal and informal mechanisms also indicated trustworthiness of other market actors and thus provided potential buyers with means to make an informed decision on whom to initiate trade with. Further, the thesis analyses the influence of hacker culture on the market, which is done mainly by analysing the forum threads but also the written comments of the feedback. It is also in this chapter that the specific market culture of cybercrime markets is revealed. Here, elements of technological development, knowledge, and skill are pivotal in order to understand the values of market actors. Members would constantly scrutinise other members’ knowledge and skill of cybercrime tools and services, and their willingness to learn. These are unique to the market culture of cybercrime markets. In addition, the inherently masculine environment is considered to be part of a broader specific market culture that spans other online illegal markets as well as cybercrime markets. The most extreme perpetuation this occurred through ‘flaming’, where members would use misogynistic insults to shame others. The structural features and mechanisms of enforcement explored on AlphaBay bear resonance to general market culture and have proven to be highly efficient and sophisticated. This thesis therefore expects future online illegal markets to adapt similar, perhaps even improved, structures. Furthermore, the specific market culture of cybercrime markets identified in this thesis proves the fruitfulness of analysing the market culture of online illegal markets; by examining their cultural norms, values, and beliefs, we can understand their behaviour and hopefully also disrupt it.