Disdain and contempt have often been taken to be vicious attitudes. This view has been further defended by Stephen Darwall in his ambitious and elaborate second-personal account of morality. In Th e Second-Person Standpoint, Darwall argues that disdain is problematic to the extent that it fails to recognize the authority and moral freedom of its object. In this paper, I will develop two answers to Darwall’s claims about disdain. First, I will argue that, if we take Darwall’s account to be ultimately grounded on what hypothetical members of the moral community would do, it would be diffi cult to argue that anything said at this level would justify an evaluation of what actual individuals should do. Second, even if we granted that the Second-Personal Standpoint could have such normative implications, I will argue that disdain, as a moralised attitude towards others who fail to behave morally, can not only be justifi ed but can also be shown to presuppose the moral freedom of the wrongdoer. Finally, I will introduce a distinction between normative and empirical expectation to further clarify this point.