Resorting to the immensely State-centric international legal system to regulate corporate human rights abuses is often viewed as inadequate. Among many proposals aiming at filling the international regulatory gaps, imposing international human rights obligations directly on corporations is a bold one, which, due to profound doctrinal and practical challenges, has yet to be agreed upon or established. However, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), given its prima facie “State-Business nexus” that blurs the traditional public-private divide, might provide a renewed opportunity to push forward the “direct international corporate accountability” campaign. This thesis investigates if SOEs indeed represent a golden chance for direct corporate accountability in the international legal regime. After giving a definitional account to SOEs, this thesis firstly examines if SOEs might qualify as State organs, i.e. the legal Status of SOEs in international law. It then, in the reverse direction, proceeds to explore if the “State-Business nexus” of SOEs as non-State actors could render the argument towards direct international corporation accountability more convincing. The major findings of this research show that: 1) SOE’s prima facie uniqueness is multi-dimensional. SOE itself represents a category that includes varied legal forms of corporate entities. Yet, SOEs remain insufficiently defined at the international level. 2) SOEs can indeed bear international human rights obligations directly as State organs, though this affirmative answer is highly conditional and exceptional. 3) For most non-State SOEs, their uniqueness does not seem to carry sufficient legal weight to distinguish them from other enterprises in a legal sense (i.e. obliging or permitting hasher legal measures), so the expectations on SOEs to “lead the example” remain largely moral/ethical. In summary, SOEs, to a limited extent, represent a renewed opportunity to rethink direct corporate accountability in international law.