The American diplomatic relationship with Syria was in 1977 mainly focused on achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The peace agreement was planned to be made at a reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference, with the U.S. and Soviet Union as co-hosts. In all dealings with Syria, this was the ultimate end goal. During the first half of 1977, Syria was seen as pivotal in making or breaking a peace agreement. They were believed to have the power to persuade the PLO to accept UN resolution 242.1 It was belied that the other Arab states would follow Syria ‘s lead because they represented a united Arab front. The U.S. did however underestimate the animosity Assad felt towards Sadat after the 1973 October War, and it turned out that Sadat wanted to make a deal separate of the other Arab nations. A deal that would be much easier for Israel to accept because they had very few common interests. In the late summer of 1977, it became obvious that Israel could not make any deal with Syria and Syria could not get the PLO to accept UN resolution 242. It was Israeli pressure, and refusal to make any compromise, that created this situation. The initial position of the Carter administration was closer to the Syrian but Israeli pressure, both domestic and abroad, made the U.S. favor a deal with only Egypt. The Carter administration’s handling of the situation in Lebanon also indicates that Israeli pressure shaped their policy towards Syria. The U.S. accepted Syria as a major player in Lebanon letting them do as they pleased, as long as they did not cross any Israeli interests. If they did, the U.S. would take action against Syria through Israel. The primary sources indicate that it may have been Israeli pressure and power rather than the actual will of the Carter administration that made this foreign policy. In the fall of 1977, U.S. policy towards Syria shifted towards isolation. It became impossible to combine U.S. commitment to Israel with getting Syria to make steps towards any kind of peace treaty. When Anwar Sadat was willing to make a separate deal with Israel, the hopes of reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference died and the idea of the Camp David Accords was born. Syria went from an important and pivotal part of any peace agreement to being totally left out in the cold. The primary sources reveal that the Carter administration’s relations with Syria was in large parts based on Israeli interests, and a result of Israeli pressure at home and abroad. The case of the Syrian Jews further enhances this theory, where Israel forced the Carter administration to act as their herald rather than the negotiator Jimmy Carter actually wanted it to be.