Self-consciousness is often defined as the ability to think of oneself as oneself, an ability that is considered to require demanding conceptual and linguistic abilities. Concept-possession is surely needed for mastery of the first-person pronoun and constructing autobiographical narratives, which again underwrites a sense of self-identity over time. If being self-conscious depends on the possession of a first-person concept, it follows that creatures who apparently lack conceptual resources could not be granted first-person mental content. This is a position which is hard to defend considering intuitions and empirical evidence on behavior and cognitive abilities displayed by pre-linguistic infants and animals. However, if they indeed are in possession of some form of self-consciousness, how would this nonconceptual self- consciousness come to expression? I will propose that we need to appeal to more basic and nonlinguistic forms of self-representation if we want to explain intentional behavior of nonlinguistic creatures, as well as to explain how the ability for higher forms of self- consciousness can emerge in the first place. This motivates the attempt to develop a theory of self-consciousness with the help of the notion of nonconceptual content. I argue that self- specifying information that is implicit in perception, bodily awareness and inter-subjective interaction are sources for nonconceptual first-person thoughts, and by being necessarily self- related, they give rise to judgements that are immune to error through misidentification.