This thesis investigates whether an Expressivism or Hybrid Expressivism account is better suited to solve “The moral problem” than cognitivist theories. “The moral problem” is the unified account of 1) the practicality requirement – a satisfactory account of moral psychology and motivation and 2) a satisfactory metaphysical and epistemological account of the objective features of morality, the objectivity requirement. I will argue that Expressivism accommodates motivational issues and the seemingly sentimental base of moral judgements better than cognitivism, and also that the theory of moral evolution seem to favour anti-realism and noncognitivism. I argue that hybrid versions of expressivism may be seen as advancing the quasi-realist project by allowing moral sentences to express belief-like states of mind in addition to desire-like states of mind, in which the belief component have propositional contents. There still remain serious unresolved issues for any expressivist – the Frege-Geach problem in particular.