This thesis deals with the paradox of forgiveness. The presumed outcome of the paradox is that forgiveness is impossible. To determine whether the outcome of the paradox is correct I start by giving an overview of the contemporary philosophical debate about forgiveness. I present what has been classified as two different and competing accounts of forgiveness: conditional and unconditional forgiveness. Further, I problematize making a distinction between two different kinds of forgiveness and propose that we look at them as two different practices, rather that two competing accounts. Further, I diagnose what appears to be a mix up of two importantly different questions concerning the nature of forgiveness: “what is forgiveness?”, and “how can forgiveness be morally justified?” I claim that we can find a solution to the paradox by focusing on giving a descriptive account of conditional forgiveness. Furthermore, the existence of the paradox of forgiveness relies on certain metaphysical assumptions about the connection between agent and act. By looking closer at this relation, and at theories about the role of wrongdoing, blame and forgiveness in our moral lives I present a way of revising these metaphysical assumptions. My conclusion is that if we look at wrongdoing and the affects it has on us as something that persist in social space, and not as private, mental events, we can explain how forgiveness is possible.