The problem of extreme poverty is a demanding challenge in our globalized world. Although Rawls recognizes that well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies, the ultimate concern of his theory is justice of societies. In this regard Singer and Pogge claim that Rawls s theory does not provide an adequate response to the suffering of distant individuals. According to them, the existence of global poverty evokes certain moral obligations of the affluent states and individuals to respond to this problem. The aim of this essay is to argue that, while addressing the problem of global poverty, Singer and Pogge establish constraints which in practice make their theories conditioned on the existence of well-functioning institutions in the poor countries. Consequently, although Singer and Pogge contest the limited scope of the Rawlsian duty of assistance, their respective proposals have problems with specifying how we can reach out to the distant poor. Nevertheless, Rawls s duty of assistance, though aiming at bringing the burdened societies into the Society of well-ordered Peoples and not at improving the well-being of individuals, provides a solution which in fact may contribute to alleviating poverty. I exemplify this claim through the problem of high-level corruption in the developing countries. In this regard I refer to a real case from Uganda where the foreign donors have continued to provide state-to-state development assistance in spite of repeating signals of misuse of the donated resources. In my opinion, Singer and Pogge do not address all implications related to this challenge. Consequently, I argue that the problem of high-level corruption in developing countries demonstrates that the proposals included in Rawls s theory of international justice may in fact have equally relevant impact on global poverty as the solutions promoted by Singer and Pogge.