The parties to the UN climate negotiations have time and again failed to agree on ambitious emissions reductions targets that can prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UN, 1992, p. 9). Lately, state leaders and UN officials have expressed great hopes for finally reaching a universal and legally binding climate agreement at this year s meeting of the UNFCCC parties in Paris. Game-theoretical perspectives on climate negotiations tell another story. The UN climate negotiations are characterized as a Prisoners Dilemma where countries are better off free riding on the efforts of others. Thus, an effective climate agreement must ensure that countries incentives for participation and compliance be restructured. Drawing on the argument that climate change is a global public good, I argue that a club approach can achieve such restructuring under the right circumstances. Previous scholarly contributions in the field of club theory (mainly David Victor) propose climate clubs as a setting that enables countries willing to use own resources to combat climate change to coordinate their efforts and simultaneously create incentives for reluctant countries to participate. The analysis focuses on two types of incentives that enthusiastic countries might utilize in a club context, namely conditional commitments and club goods. Exploring various models and proposals of such incentives and using both primary and secondary sources, I aim to advance current knowledge concerning the prospects for effective climate cooperation through climate clubs. I argue that, it is the very ties between conditional commitments and club goods that might strengthen participation and compliance. I find that under the right circumstances, these incentives can successfully induce reluctant countries to follow suit. In particular, a club approach can help change the climate change mitigation game into a coordination game. However, I also find that a troubling U.S.-China relationship, risks of carbon leakage, processes of negative spillover into other multilateral efforts, existing trade laws, and protectionist concerns constitute substantial barriers for developing an effective climate club.