Over the last decade, the field of ministerial durability – exploring why some cabinet ministers are replaced and others not – has taken an empirical turn. Among others, Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2012) scrutinize the relationship between cabinet ministers and Prime Ministers in Britain, while Bucur (2013) analyze how ministers in semi-presidential systems are held accountable by presidents, parties, and prime ministers. However, ministers in multi-party parliamentary democracies have received little attention. In this thesis, I explore what determines ministerial durability in post-war Norway. By using an unmatched data set combination of Norwegian ministers and the resignation calls they received during their tenure, this thesis provides three main contributions. Firstly, I find that Norwegian ministers are held accountable by party leaders based on their performance, merits, and ambitions – not personal characteristics. Secondly, I uncover that newspapers have an alarming influence on the ministerial deselection process. Finally, I find that resignation calls – a measure for ministerial performance – bares with it both endogeneity and validity problems that should be taken into consideration by further studies on ministerial durability.