Abstract
This thesis argues that Egypt's constitutional minority protection has improved slightly since the Arab Spring as a result of military institutional interests and religious passions. Constitutional content depends upon forces and mechanisms present in the constitution-making process, as identified by Elster in 1995. Which forces and mechanisms are the most visible in the process depends upon the actors in the constitution-making process as well as the contextual situation. Both the 2011 Declaration and the 2014 Constitution of Egypt were created by the military, whereas the process towards the 2012 Constitution was led by an Islamist dominated parliament. Ideally, minority protection should be grounded in reason and a concept of human rights and democracy. The rights secured are mainly a result of religious passion in 2012 Constitution, and institutional interests in the two military constitutions. Although the 2014 Constitution yield the best constitutional minority protection seen in the history of the Arab Republic of Egypt, this comes at the expense of other democratic rights. The Copts would likely benefit the most from a democratic and stable regime. While the current military regime grants them certain rights, the trade off of democracy for minority rights seems like a bad bargain in the long run. The constitutional improvement of minority protection may remain just that: Constitutional and theoretical, but not applied to real life.