As one of the first big energy exporting states, Russia acceded to the WTO in 2012 after 17 years of negotiations. The distribution of power in the WTO accession process is considered to be asymmetrical in favour of the incumbent members. This is because the member states can demand commitments from the applicant country on a wide range of issues in exchange for granting membership. The EU did not, however, manage to get the desired commitment from Russia regarding the country s practice of energy dual pricing, despite the fact that it was an issue of great importance to the EU. In this thesis, I examine the following research question: How can the power distribution between the EU and Russia explain the negotiation outcome on the issue of energy dual pricing in Russia s accession to the WTO? Since Russia is one of the first big energy exporters to accede to the WTO, the country s accession process can shed light on the WTO as a forum for settling difficult energy issues. The energy dual pricing debate between the EU and Russia can illustrate a basic conflict of interest between the acceding energy–exporting countries and the energy-importing members over who will shape the understanding of the WTO rules concerning energy. In this case study I have used Hernes model of power to systematize the analysis of the distribution of power between the EU and Russia. As an alternative explanation of the negotiation outcome I will look at the effect of the EU s ability to argue their case in accordance with the WTO legal framework. As a last possible explanation I will examine whether the EU believed that it had other possible venues of cooperation outside the WTO where the EU had better chances to settle the issue. I found that that the power distribution in the WTO accession to a large degree can explain the outcome on energy dual pricing. The EU had substantial power to get commitments from Russia in the WTO accession, but the possibility for issue linkages gave Russia power as well. This is because it could concede in sectors of less importance, in exchange for lenience on energy issues like energy dual pricing. The fact that the EU had weak legal backing for its claim and the possibility to settle the issue outside the WTO could also have had some effect on the negotiation outcome.