Abstract In Syria we see cyber-armies , consisting of both pro- and anti regime combatant non-state actors, waging organized (dis-) information campaigns in cyberspace. Pushing an agenda of subversion, it is a different and more conflictual form of cyber-interaction then analyzed before. Moving from online media as an outlet and opinion-sharing platform, unauthorized alterations and manipulation resembles traditional disinformation and propaganda campaigns. One of the first of its kind, this phenomenon requires closer inquiry. The research question guiding the thesis is therefore: Why and how do non-state actors use cyberspace in modern conflict? . Underpinning the research question is several assumptions that will be evaluated in the case study. Firstly, we must establish that non-state actors use cyberspace as component in their conflict strategy. Secondly, this thesis is founded in the belief that they use it as a tool of subversion aimed at undermining their opponent. These warriors actively sabotage, persecute, and spy on each other and perceived supporters by hacking accounts, defacing websites and manipulating social media outlets. Both parties uses online media to sell their story to the domestic and global audience but they also actively use hacking as a tool in conflict and manipulate how events are perceived. Moving from (social) media as an outlet for opinions to active and unauthorized alterations resembles disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Non-state actors use this domain in conflict situations to exploit it s potential for waging soft wars as a form of conflict participation where agendas and narratives compete. The third assumption is that they promote a strategic narrative and soft power through guerrilla tactics. The case study will illustrate that the ways of real world conflicts thus are adapted to cyberspace to attack the center of gravity in the opponent. This finding leads the conclusion that the cyber warriors seen in Syria is not a new phenomenon, simply the adaption of old strategies in a new domain. Lastly, the thesis operates under the assumption that the reach and effectiveness (measured in the level of attention and number of attacks) of the non-state actors depend on the level of organization and resources. These assumptions can be summarized in five points: These assumptions can be summarized in five points: (1) Non-state actors use cyberspace in conflicts; (2) Subversion is the ultimate goal of their actions in cyberspace; (3) This is done by spreading a strategic narrative and build soft power; (4) To reach their goal, they use guerrilla tactics; (5) The effectiveness is determined by level of organization and resources. This thesis will combine literature on soft power and subversion within the framework of conflict in cyberspace. It argues that cyberspace gives non-state actors a new domain to undermine the role of the state or the opposition, but that neither the nature of conflict or the nature of subversion enters a new paradigm. Strategic narratives are used in the hope of shaping the relative soft power like in traditional conflicts. Combining an element of surprise, rapid movement, and sabotage these actors rectify their weaknesses, and promote a particular strategic narrative to alter the relative soft power balance. We therefore see a potential trend of soft war moving into cyberspace. In this thesis the data collection is done by combining a targeted literature search with a large collection of primary data on attacks completed during the course of the Syrian conflict. One of the main contributions of this work is therefore an extensive empirical record of cyber attacks during the Syrian conflict. All attacks meeting the criteria have been included in an attempt to provide as unbiased review as possible. This is presented in the appendix and forms the basis for the evaluation done in the analysis. This thesis finds some support for all the assumptions, but naturally any soft element to conflict is complicated to measure during an ongoing conflict . What is clear from the case study is that non-state actors use cyberspace extensively in the Syrian conflict. It is the most socially mediated conflict in history (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2014), and this domain still enjoys the perception as a channel for unmediated information. Manipulation and justifications are therefore key messages spread to undermine the adversary s position in the real world conflict. Ultimately they seek to subvert each other, aided by strategic narratives to shape the relative soft power balance. However, as they operate in an online maze and lack resources necessary for direct conflict, the actors studied use what can be called cyber guerrilla tactics. One of the actors studied, the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), is rather successful in hindering information diffusion, implement espionage software, and infiltrate opposition online communication networks. The other party to the conflict, the opposition, is found however to have a much shorter empirical record and gains less attention. This is in great extent explained by their organizational proficiency.