In this thesis I look at Chalmers (1995) Hard Problem of philosophy, and discuss some possible solutions to it. In order to come up with an answer to the Hard Problem it is necessary to explain the relationship between conscious experience and the physical world/neural activity in the brain. The main topic is an investigation of how phenomenology, in the way it is described in Alva Nöe s enacted approach can be used by analytic philosophy of mind for the sake of creating a better, more satisfying answer to how we come to have the experienced and subjective qualities that are connected with consciousness. This is done through a discussion of what an adequate theory of consciousness should look like, where I look at both causal and constitutive models for explanation. I later move on to a discussion of the problems connected to some of the analytical explanations of consciousness, and propose some ways in which the phenomenological understanding of consciousness can be used to supplement these theories. In conclusion I propose that the phenomenological way to account for consciousness can be used as a supplement to functionalism in order for this theory to give an adequate explanation of the experiential consciousness.