There is a vast literature on the issue of primitive accumulation of capital, mostly applying an economic perspective. Contrary to these studies, this thesis undertakes a political perspective to the process of primitive accumulation. I compare two cases in the same process of rural transformation and attempt to find out whether political factors cause variation in the ongoing development process. More specifically I investigate whether the local political institutions foster democracy in the governance of primitive accumulation. The issue of peasant and rural political conflicts and functioning political institutions is a key issue in India given that most people still live in these areas. This thesis thoroughly investigates the reasons for the variation found between the local democratic functioning and the inclusion of the rural population in the states of West Bengal and Jharkhand. The findings of this study documents on the one hand that the primitive accumulation of capital in West Bengal and Jharkhand is realized and linked with democratic deficits and a lack of political transparency. On the other hand those democratic elements that are present has nevertheless led to a significantly different process of primitive accumulation compared to similar historical processes. I also find signs of democratization especially in the case from West Bengal, where formerly excluded peasant and indigenous groups has been able to put perceived collective issues on the political agenda. My findings suggest that, contrary to pure economic perspectives of primitive accumulation that local political institutions are relevant for key elements of primitive accumulation of capital.