This thesis is an attempt to approach the questions of environmental ethics from a Rortyan, anti-foundationalist perspective. I draw on the writings of Richard Rorty in order to construe a perspective on environmental values which takes our shared convictions as a starting point, and which conceives philosophical theory as summary of, rather than foundational to, society. From this perspective, theory is not likely to attain the ethical and practical changes we deem necessary to reduce our environmental impact. Moral progress is conceived not as an increase in moral knowledge, but as an extension of loyalty which can emerge through the experience of the sufferings of new kinds of beings. With Rorty, I argue that the provision of such experiences is the task narrative and poetic literature rather than philosophical theories. The ambition of what I call environmental foundationalism to provide a solid foundation for environmental values is accordingly abandoned. Consequently, I turn creative nature-writing in order to get illustrate the part that narrative and poetic literature could play in our progress towards environmental values and responsibility. I argue that creative works of literature has the potential to push us in the right direction. In the last chapter, I address the point that although changes in our ethical convictions are an important part of coping with the environmental challenges, moral progress alone will not ensure the sustainability of our practices. I argue that there is a considerable value-action gap between our increasing environmental convictions and our ability and willingness to change our concrete practices and habits. Contrary to Timothy Morton, who conceives our inability to think big enough to be the problem, I argue that our prevalent descriptions of the environmental crisis, with their focus on its vastness, complexity and gravity, seem to paralyze the public more than it encourages it. To Rorty, vocabularies are approached as tools for the achievement of practical purposes rather than media for mirroring nature. The failure of our current vocabularies to promote practical change is reason enough to suggest other vocabularies in its place. Accordingly, I suggest that while we let creative writers keep up the work of ethical extension, the practical achievement of our convictions may require that we tone down the grandeur and complexity of our public descriptions of the environmental challenge.