The purpose of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following research question: why and how did the Republican Party benefit from the increased flow of money outside traditional party structures which resulted from the campaign finance reform of the 1970s? On the basis of the partisan theory of reform, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent amendments are described as part of a Democratic effort to stop the flow of money into Republican coffers. Nevertheless, in light of the financial and electoral success experienced by the GOP in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections, it is argued that the Democratic campaign finance strategy backfired. The thesis demonstrates that the legislation enacted in the 1970s provided interest groups with expanded opportunities to influence elections through financial involvement. Furthermore, on the basis of thorough examination of the ventures of the increasing amount of political action committees in the wake of the FECA, it is argued that conservative leaning groups were disproportionately successful in taking advantage of these opportunities. The thesis emphasizes the financial involvement of business PACs and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, and connects their endeavors to the House and the Senate gains experienced by the Republican Party in 1978 and 1980.