The thesis concerns moral motivation and how one can determine the difference between morality and normativity in general. These issues are answered by an analysis of the individual person, both in terms of an ontological determination of what human beings are, and in terms of central concerns related to the ontological account.The first chapter of the thesis is an exegesis and discussion of how these issues are attempted answered by Christine Korsgaard, who introduces her notion of "practical identity" as an answer to the questions of how morality is normative, and how it differs from other concerns. I argue that the means Korsgaard employs in order to make this argument leads to practical consequences that makes her account problematic. The central claim in this argument is that Korsgaard's account is problematic because of the way she conceives the relation between subject or individual and intersubjectivity. The next two chapters represents an attempt to provide an alternative account of practical identity, where the main character is G. W. F. Hegel. This analysis is based on a view of the individual where it from the outset is seen in relation with objectivity and intersubjectivity. The main questions that leads this analysis are questions of what how the individual can be described as an agent with normative concerns, and whether morality is a special branch of this normativity. I argue that the need for correspondence with the world and recognition captures the view of the human individual as an agent. The difference between morality and normativity is characterised by that the other comes to count, something that makes mutual recognition possible.