Panpsychism is the view that mentality, in some sense of the word, is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. Physicalism, the predominant view held by philosophers today, asserts that everything is physical; in addition, it is ordinarily held that the physical is fundamentally non-mental. In this thesis, I will draw on arguments from both contemporary analytic philosophers and the history of philosophy in order to show that ordinary physicalism is deeply flawed as a metaphysical thesis, as it is incompatible with realism about consciousness, realism about force and causality, and the idea that things must have non-relational, intrinsic properties. In the course of this, panpsychism will suggest itself as an attractive alternative. It can accommodate the ontological kinds that physicalism cannot, and this without falling into equally severe problems of its own. I conclude, contrary to common philosophical opinion, that panpsychism is a coherent, plausible, parsimonious and scientifically respectable metaphysic.
If you have questions regarding the thesis, please contact the author: Hedda Hassel Mørch (firstname.lastname@example.org)