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dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T11:31:58Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T11:31:58Z
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.date.submitted2010-10-11en_US
dc.identifier.citationBjørdal, Frode. A theory of knowledge. Doktoravhandling, University of Oslo, 1993en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/24461
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known iff they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw some epistemological and semantical consequences pertaining to such issues as the nature of epistemological justification, the Lottery Paradox, philosophical skepticism and the semantics of belief contexts.eng
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.titleA theory of knowledgeen_US
dc.typeDoctoral thesisen_US
dc.date.updated2010-10-11en_US
dc.creator.authorBjørdal, Frodeen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::000en_US
cristin.unitcode143300en_US
cristin.unitnameFilosofi, ide- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språken_US
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft.au=Bjørdal, Frode&rft.title=A theory of knowledge&rft.inst=University of Oslo&rft.date=1993&rft.degree=Doktoravhandlingen_US
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-26196en_US
dc.type.documentDoktoravhandlingen_US
dc.identifier.duo106170en_US
dc.contributor.supervisorAnthony Brueckneren_US
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/24461/1/Dissertation-Bjoerdal.pdf


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