As year 2008 neared its completion, world headlines focused on the fighting between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli announced purpose of this military operation was to stop the firing of rockets into southern Israel and of targeting members, security forces and infrastructure of those deemed responsible, namely members of the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its acronym – Hamas. The fighting followed a fragile six-month cease fire between Hamas and Israel as well as nearly three years of Israeli and international boycott of Hamas, an isolation policy implemented following Hamas’ surprise victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006. This boycott was legitimized by Hamas’ history of militant and violent behaviour towards Israel and the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Notwithstanding the relative unison world criticism of Israel’s disproportional use of force in the fighting, the coverage of the conflict, and of Hamas in particular, as well as Israeli and international responses following the elections of January 2006, are nevertheless important testimonies of Israel’s and the Western world’s stigmatized perception of Hamas. This perception centres on an understanding of Hamas as an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist organization, whose goals are the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a state governed on Shari’a in its stead. This dissertation argues that Hamas is, in fact, an organization more flexible with regards to its original stated goals, and not just a fundamentalist religious organization basing itself on religious ideology and doctrine. This argument is approached by examining two different aspects of Hamas’ thoughts regarding a future Palestinian state, the central question being: What signifies Palestinian statehood for Hamas? First; by examining Hamas’ theoretical thoughts and by discussing its practical behaviour, it is argued that Hamas’ philosophical thoughts regarding statehood is not what is commonly perceived in the Western world as a fundamentalist Shari’a state, but that it in some ways signifies Western conceptions of democracy. Second; by examining Hamas’ approaches and actions in light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process – the violent, the peaceful and the political – it is also argued that Hamas, despite its stated goal of the destruction of the Jewish state is willing to compromise on its ideological stand and accept a two-state solution to the conflict.