The first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 left a range of complex and difficult questions unanswered. The UN Partition Plan of November 1947, which had called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, had failed to materialize. Instead, the name Palestine had been effectively erased from the map, along with the prospects for an independent state for the Palestinians. For while the Jews had aquired their dreams of statehood, and increased their share of mandatory Palestine from 56 to 77 per cent, the Palestinian society had been left in ruins, reducing the majority of the Palestinians to refugees on the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in the neighbouring Arab states. Jerusalem, a city of unique religious significance, had been divided between Israel and Transjordan, contrary to the decisions of the UN, who wanted to secure free access for all religious groups to the city by establishing an international regime. From the end of 1948, the newly established Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was composed of representatives from the United States, France and Turkey, was charged with the responsibility of finding a solution to the outstanding questions between the Arab and the Israelis. Sadly, however, the history of the PCC is one of failure. During its three years of active diplomacy, the PCC passed through an initial stage of great optimism and hope to a state of increasing frustration and futility, until, at the end of 1951, it became clear that it had failed completely to achieve any substantial results and that continued efforts were useless. Why did the Commission fail? What was its influence and position, and how did this affect the outcome of the negotiations?