A central question in economics and distributive justice is: “for what should people be held responsible?” Different theories give very different answers to this seemingly simple question. This paper will venture into the maze of theories covering justice and equity, not in an attempt to give a final answer but with a hope of bringing clarity to this question. As the title indicates, my aim is not to pin down the one normative theory that is “correct”, but to reveal peoples general opinion on distributive justice in a positivistic manner. I will therefore refrain from stating what objectively are fair and unfair principles of distribution. What I will do is to try to find the principle people in general regard as fair in distributional policies. Different normative ideals give different answers to what a just distribution is, spanning from the theories that place no responsibility on the agent, to the theories that place full responsibility on the agent; from Strict Egalitarianism in one end of the scale, to Libertarianism in the other end. A consequence of egalitarianism is that no responsibility is placed on the agent. Here the distribution is independent of both talent and effort but strives for an equal distribution of goods or welfare over the entire population, holding no one responsible for neither their effort nor their talent1. Contrary to that we have Libertarianism as a representative for full responsibility. Here the distribution depends on the value of the agent’s contribution, as a product of talent and effort. People are thus held responsible for both their talent and their effort. In the middle of this scale – or at least somewhere between the two – we have Liberal Egalitarianism. Here the distribution depends solely on effort, and combining egalitarianism with personal freedom, holding people responsible for their choices, the liberal egalitarian ideal seeks to equate differences in welfare originating from differences in talent, but at the same time letting inequalities caused by differences in chosen effort subsist. When discussing liberal egalitarianism, a debate on where to draw theresponsibility cut, the cut between factors that are controllable or not controllable by the individual person, is included, as this question is of utmost importance when applying this principle.Behavioural economics has tried to answer the question of personal responsibility and fair distributions using game theory. In a positivistic tradition, behavioural economists have traditionally been concerned with whether people really do care about what is right or fair. Results from previous dictator and ultimatum games go some way in finding the answer, but common to almost all these experiments is their inability to show how people weigh effort and talent against each other. People do not only care about their own well being, but include some form of ethical consideration as an integral part of the decision-making process. Robust conclusions both from Ultimatum games as well as Dictator games show that people offer more than any profit maximising agent would. This tells us that people are at least partially motivated by moral norms when sharing a given sum of money, but little about what people perceive as fair or just. A recent game experiment conducted by Cappelen et al. (forthcoming)2 has tried to address this issue. In this experiment, they seek to study howpeople’s perception of a just distribution relies upon each player’s talent and effort put into producing a contribution to a pool of goods. The aim of their experiment is to estimate the prevalence of four different distributive principles as well as the weight the players attach to fairness considerations. However, this experiment has two problematic issues. Firstly, the players are chosen from a homogenous group, and secondly, the cut between talent and effort is too clear compared to what is experienced in the real world. I wish to contribute to the research done by Cappelen et al. with a different approach. Using a vignette questionnaire, my aim is to study where people’s general perception of justice is placed on the scale from full responsibility to no responsibility, and to check if the results from Cappelen et al. are changed when the cut between effort and talent is blurred. Blurring the cut is done through the introduction of another variable (in addition to the two variable used in Cappelen et al.) in the vignettes. The survey will be conducted on two separate groups to ensure a heterogeneous selection of subjects. I find it interesting to study whether there are any significant differences between different groups of students, asindicated by Fehr & Schmidt (2004). The results will be compared to the results from Cappelen et al. The use of the vignette format is by no means a miracle solution, but is addresses neatly the issues pointed out above, while other information revealed by the Cappelen et al. design is sadly lost. In chapter 2 I present the normative theories of distributive justice along an axis of responsibility, from egalitarianism to libertarianism. Chapter 3 covers the relevant work done in experimental economics on the issue at hand, as well as a more thorough presentation of the Cappelen et al. experiment. In chapter 4 the vignette survey is presented, with selection of subjects, method and results. Lastly, in chapter 5, a discussion of the results from the vignette survey as well as a comparison of the results from the vignette survey with the results from Cappelen et al.