The objective of this master s thesis was to address the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The study had a twofold focus, namely (1) identifying the fundamental problem characteristics of the global climate change problem and (2) the problem-solving capacity efforts made to address the problem. It focused on research about environmental governance structures within the climate regime and how well these scores compared to a predefined effectiveness variable. The study presents the case that the Protocol is not able to internalize negative environmental externalities. As a result the actor s cost-benefit calculus is systematically biased toward a particular course of action. This is coupled with a bargaining situation characterized by asymmetrical interests. The result, according to Underdal s (2002) terminology, is a situation characterized by a high degree of problem malignancy. Secondly, the thesis seeks to give a characterization of the capacity of the international environment to solve this malignant problem. On this account international climate change bureaucracy was found to have a positive effect on the negotiation process, together with informal leadership strategies pursued by the EU. However, regime effectiveness is negatively affected by the absence of a veto-player, given its control over a major part of the activity the regime seeks to manage.