Liberal egalitarianism can offer two distinct perspectives on the morality of secession from a liberal state. One is permissive. The other is quite restrictive. This essay offers a defence of the latter variant, which is often called Just-Cause theory. On this view, secession can only be morally justified as a means to rectify past grievances on the part of the secessionist group. Secession must have a just cause. If none can be found, then the territorial sovereignty of a state that upholds liberal democratic rule cannot be thwarted. According to the rival position – Choice-theory – secession can be justified even in the absence of any injustice. This more permissive view on state breaking is expected to follow from valuing freedom of political association. I demonstrate how both approaches can be developed from central commitments of liberal egalitarian morality. These commitments often come into conflict. And the case of political divorce is no exception. A liberal theory of secession must therefore be at pains to come up with the best possible balancing of important, yet incongruous, commitments. In that respect, I argue that the Just-Cause approach represents the best overall liberal egalitarian theory of secession.